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Abstract: This article combines the research strands of moral politics and
political behavior by focusing on the effect of individual and contextual
religiosity on individual vote decisions in popular initiatives and public
referenda concerning morally charged issues. We rely on a total of 13 surveys
with 1,000 respondents each conducted after every referendum on moral
policies in Switzerland between 1992 and 2012. Results based on cross-
classified multilevel models show that religious behaving instead of nominal
religious belonging plays a crucial role in decision making on moral issues.
This supports the idea that the traditional confessional cleavage is replaced by
a new religious cleavage that divides the religious from the secular. This
newer cleavage is characterized by party alignments that extend from electoral
to direct democratic voting behavior. Overall, our study lends support to
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previous findings drawn from American research on moral politics, direct
democracies, and the public role of religion.
INTRODUCTION
Is it right to end a pregnancy prematurely? Are people in same-sex rela-
tionships entitled to the same rights and privileges as heterosexual
couples? Or is deviant behavior such as taking drugs or heavy drinking
justifiable at any time? Although some would argue that public attitudes
concerning these moral issues have become increasingly liberal over the
last few decades, religion continues to play a pivotal role in the formation
of core values and beliefs of what is right or wrong (Flanagan and Lee
2003; Inglehart and Baker 2000; Minkenberg 2002; Toft et al. 2011).
Numerous studies have highlighted the importance of religious forces in
explaining moral policy outcomes (Donovan et al. 2008; Fairbanks
1978; Feddersen et al. 2009; Fink 2008; Haider-Markel 2001; Hutcheson
and Taylor 1973; Minkenberg 2002; Morgan and Meier 1980; Olson
et al. 2006; Roh and Haider-Markel 2003). These studies have scrutinized
the effects of religion at the state level (e.g., Morgan and Meier 1980), reli-
gious orientations in parliaments (Haider-Markel 2001), the influence of
religious groupings and predominant churches on legislating abortion,
homosexuality, or gambling (Fabrizio 2001; Olson et al. 2006), or the dif-
ferences in moral policy legislature across nation states and religions
(Engeli 2009; Fink 2008; Schiffino et al. 2009).
Moral issues and their connection to religiosity have recently also
attracted considerable attention in the study of political behavior. Heated
debates in the United States revolved around the so-called culture wars,
pitting orthodox and progressive groups against one another on moral
issues such as abortion, gay rights, or family values. This culture war
resulted in a striking religious gap in the 2000 and 2004 presidential elec-
tions (e.g., Campbell 2007; Donovan et al. 2008; Fiorina 2005; Green
2010; Hunter 1991; Layman and Green 2005). In Europe, scholars have
focused renewed interest on the stability and change of the traditional reli-
gious cleavages that once shaped the formation of party systems and that
continue to structure mass electoral behavior in many European countries
(e.g., Ackermann and Traunmüller 2014; Brooks et al. 2006; Elff 2007;
Essmer and Pettersson 2010; Knutsen 2004; Minkenberg 2010).
In this study, our aim is to combine these two research strands of moral
politics and political behavior by focusing on the effect of individual and
contextual religiosity on individual vote decisions in popular initiatives
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and public referenda concerning morally charged issues, such as abortion
or drug abuse. Although these issues are highly salient to the public and
many countries beyond the United States legislate moral issues through
direct democratic instruments (e.g., Italy, Ireland, Portugal, and New
Zealand), explanatory factors which could explain citizens’ vote decisions
on these issues have, for the most part, been neglected in empirical
research.
The present study expands existing research on religion and moral pol-
icies in two important ways. First, we depart from the traditional policy-
based research field of moral politics. Most of the research in this field
has focused exclusively on the policy-making process or the framing of
moral issues on various levels, such as the parliament or the federal and
the subnational levels of government (Engeli and Varone 2011; Haider-
Markel 2001; Mooney and Lee 2001; Morgan and Meier 1980). While
this certainly is where policy-making and legislating mainly takes place,
this is not true for countries offering a wide range of direct democratic
instruments where the citizens decide on laws and regulations. Although
here citizens’ characteristics may play a crucial role in decisions to liber-
alize or restrict moral policies, the extant research has focused primarily on
state-level attributes in explaining variations in moral policy outcomes in
public referenda and initiatives (see Fairbanks 1977; Morgan and Meier
1980). In contrast, we focus on the effects of individual-level attributes
and attitudes, particularly religious belonging and behaving, for the liber-
alization of moral issues. In addition, we further consider possible context-
ual-level religious factors, such as the prevalence of Catholicism on the
cantonal-level and the party paroles on the vote-specific level that may
influence the relation between individual religiosity and voting decisions
on moral issues.
Second, we add a new perspective on the relationship between direct
democracy and moral politics by extending existing research on the
United States to another country with well-established direct democratic
instruments, namely Switzerland. Although Swiss direct democracy
differs from what is practiced in the United States, as it is not limited to
the state or local level but is practiced at all federal levels, both countries
are very similar with regard to their long-lasting experience, extensive use
as well as their specific types of direct democratic instruments, such as the
referendum and popular initiative (Linder 2010, 162). Moreover, the
United States and Switzerland are often declared as “Sister Republics”
due to their enduring republican system as well as their extensive federalist
structure (Hutson 1991). In the past, Switzerland has held a wide range of
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national referenda and public initiatives on moral issues and may therefore
be regarded as an exemplary case for assessing direct democracy’s effect
on moral policy.
Moreover, Switzerland is characterized by a strong traditional confes-
sional cleavage between reformed Protestantism (initiated by Zwingli
and Calvin in Zurich, Geneva, and Bern) on the one hand and
Catholicism (in the rural cantons of central Switzerland) on the other.
This confessional divide between Protestants and Catholics was once
the source of considerable conflict and continues to play a decisive role
in party identification and voting behavior, such as Catholics’ preference
for the CVP (Christ-Democratic Popular Party) (Geissbühler 1999;
Geser, 1997; Kriesi and Trechsel 2008; Lachat 2012; Lijphart 1979;
Linder 2010; Voll 1991). The mechanisms and individual factors explain-
ing vote decisions for political candidates or party programs in elections
do not however necessarily overlap with the factors influencing vote deci-
sions on specific policy questions in referenda. In fact, it has been argued
that political loyalties based on the traditional confessional cleavage may
be stronger and more durable for party identification and more volatile in
terms of direct democratic voting behavior (Voll 1991, 379).
Methodologically, we rely on a total of 13 surveys with approximately
1,000 respondents each conducted after each referendum on moral policies
in Switzerland between 1992 and 2012. The information provided by these
surveys allows us to investigate individual political behavior concerning
moral issues in great depth. By going beyond the effect of moral issues
on voter turnout (Biggers 2011; Tolbert et al. 2005), we not only further
the research on moral policies and direct democracy, but also investigate
the origins of liberalized moral policies reached through direct democratic
means and what role the religious factor plays in decision-making.
We proceed by outlining the key features of moral policies, focusing on
how religion influences the liberalization of these policies. After defining
our main research hypotheses, we present our data and methods. In the
section to follow, we discuss our main results concerning individual reli-
gious behavior and the liberalization of moral policies. A discussion of
these results and a conclusion finally complete the article.
CONFLICTS OF BASIC VALUES – MORAL ISSUES
Within recent years the clash of fundamental values regarding moral issues
has fuelled heated public debates and scholarly research (Kirchner et al.
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2011; Knill 2013; Mooney 2001; Mooney and Schuldt 2008; Studlar
2001; Studlar et al. 2013). This clash of values revolves mainly around
questions of first principles such as matters of life and death or deviant
behavior. An issue is declared as moral as soon as one group feels its
core values or belief system threatened by an issue. Moral issues are there-
fore primarily defined by their framing rather than by their mere content
(Engeli and Varone 2011, 241; Mooney 2001, 3; Mooney and Schuldt
2008, 201; Meier 1994, 4). Mooney (2001, 4) further specifies that “a
policy is classified as a morality policy based on the perceptions of the
actors involved and the terms of debate among them.” Against this back-
ground any issue may become morally charged as soon as it affects a
group’s core principles. Following the literature (especially Knill 2013;
Mooney 2001; Mooney and Schuldt 2008; Studlar 2001; Studlar et al.
2013), the most common morally charged issues are abortion, euthanasia,
homosexuality, and questions on drug abuse.1
Moral issues are further connected to three basic attributes: First, they
are technically simple due to their straightforward conception of right
and wrong (Mooney and Schuldt 2008, 201). Moral issues only allow
two positions, being in favor or against it, whereas issues on taxation or
economic matters allow positions between these two opposing poles.
Additionally, moral issues are often framed in simple pictographic ways:
there is the “sexual sinner” or the “irresponsible drinker” (see e.g.,
Engeli and Varone 2011, 241). Even rather technical issues such as
stem cell research are easily understandable since they may be reduced
to the question of life and death. Second, it is difficult to reach compro-
mises on moral issues, as they concern issues of the heart and are consti-
tuted of two opposing positions. They comprise a zero sum game: a new
regulation, the liberalization of abortion for example, allows a new set of
values win; the old values are consequently defeated. Since they are based
on the dichotomy of right and wrong, moral issues are thus not divisible
(Engeli and Varone 2011; Mooney 2001). Third, due to their simplicity,
moral issues are highly salient in public debates. Every citizen can
easily build his or her opinion on these issues since there are only two pos-
sible positions. Along these lines, Grummel (2008) found that voter
turnout is higher when moral issues are on the ballot. In this line, the
turnout for the votes in our sample tends to be higher than in non-moral
ballot votes. Moral issues are matters of the heart, which, by definition,
are salient to the public and are decided on according to gut feelings.
The three above-mentioned features suggest increased difficulties in
implementing decisions on moral issues, due especially to their high
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public salience and their indivisibility. Compared to non-morally charged
policies, decisions on liberalizing or restricting moral policies are often
more aligned to the prevailing public opinion (Camobreco and Barnello
2008; Mooney and Lee 2000; Mooney and Schuldt 2008).
Consequently, moral issues frequently find their way onto the ballot,
thereby leaving the decision process to the public (Biggers 2011).
Politicians can easily withdraw from these highly conflictual issues and
avoid playing a zero sum game with their voters (Tolbert et al. 2005).
Despite this top-down decision-making process, groups that feel their
core beliefs to be affected use popular initiatives, so-called bottom-up
instruments, as a channel to enforce regulations on moral issues.
According to Studlar (2001, 40), “moral issues are one of the major cat-
egories of issues subjected to initiatives and referenda where they are
available.”
For the case of Switzerland, the prototype of direct democracy, this
means that the most important decisions on moral policies take place
via public referenda and initiatives. Similar to the United States,
Switzerland also offers direct democratic instruments at the subnational
level, although most of the decisions on moral issues are made on the
national level. And unlike in the United States, most of the issues may
only be regulated on the national level in Switzerland (e.g., abortion or
same-sex marriage). Regarding moral issues, we were able to identify
13 national moral initiatives and referenda that occurred between 1992
and the present in Switzerland (see Table 1 for more details).
As we and existing research in this field claim that moral issues are gen-
erally salient to the public, Figure 1 depicts the public and personal sali-
ency of the respective moral ballot vote (on a scale ranging from 1 to 10).
Overall we can see that the public salience on these issues is slightly
higher in each of the 13 referenda for which data is available than the per-
sonal salience of the issue. Additionally, we took the turnout rates for
these issues into account. The turnout gives a hint about the general sali-
ency as more salient issues will draw more people to the ballot box (see
e.g., Grummel 2008; Smith 2001; Tolbert et al. 2001). In general, the
long-term average turnout rate for Swiss ballot votes is 45 percent (see
Vox Analysis). Our selected moral issue votes, however, exhibit an
average turnout of 50 percent for the 13 votes. These comparatively
higher turnouts as well as the descriptive statistics in Figure 1 underscore
the increased public saliency of morality issues at the ballot box in
Switzerland.
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Table 1. Swiss Votes concerning moral issues (1992 – present)
No. date* title issue type % yes votes liberal/restrictive
513 28 Nov. 1993 Popular initiative on “the reduction of alcohol
problems”
addictive behavior 25.25 yes = restrictive
516 28 Nov. 1993 Popular initiative on “the reduction of tobacco
problems”
addictive behavior 25.51 yes = restrictive
621 28 Sept. 1997 Popular initiative on “youth without drugs” addictive behavior 29.34 yes = restrictive
631 7 June 1998 Popular initiative on “the protection of environment
and life against genetic manipulation”
genetic engineering 33.29 yes = restrictive
653 29 Nov. 1998 Popular initiative on “a sensible drug policy” addictive behavior 26.01 yes = liberal
683 13 June 1999 Federal enactment on the medical prescription of
heroin
addictive behavior 54.42 yes = liberal
694 12 March 2000 Popular initiative on “the protection of humans against
manipulations of reproduction technologies”
genetic engineering 28.24 yes = restrictive
771 2 June 2002 Swiss Criminal Code (abortion) sexuality 72.15 yes = liberal
772 2 June 2002 Popular initiative on “the protection of mothers in
need and protection of the unborn child’s life”
sexuality 18.25 yes = restrictive
863 28 Nov. 2004 Federal Code on the research on embryonic stem cells genetic engineering 66.39 yes = liberal
872 5 June 2005 Federal code on same-sex marriage sexuality 58.04 yes = liberal
974 30 Nov. 2008 Popular initiative on “a sensible cannabis policy with
an effective protection of the youth”
addictive behavior 36.74 yes = liberal
975 30 Nov. 2008 Federal Code on narcotic substances and psychotropic
substances
addictive behavior 68.07 yes = liberal
*Note: information was retrieved from http://forsdata.unil.ch/projects/Voxit/docu_xl_htmD/ListeVoxDispoD.htm?lang=d&menu=4; The numbers refer to the
numbering of the Voxit homepage; for the empirical analysis the votes were recoded so that a value of one always indicates a liberal voting decision.
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RELIGION AND MORAL VOTES
Since moral policies are based on first principles researchers often rely on
cultural factors to explain moral policy outcomes (see e.g., Castles 1994;
Fink 2008; Minkenberg 2002; Pickel 2001). Decisions on moral issues are
made in political conflicts over indivisible values, which, in turn, are often
firmly rooted in religious conceptions of right and wrong (Biggers 2011, 4).
Since religion is a key determinant of “competing notions of how we should
and should not live — the moral order” (Leege et al. 2002, 13), it is not
surprising that it is considered one of the most important factors in explain-
ing moral policy outcomes (Fairbanks 1977; Fink 2008; Hutcheson and
Taylor 1973; Minkenberg 2002; Morgan and Meier 1980). Fink (2008),
for instance, shows that although economic interest plays a decisive role
in stem cell research, variations in embryo research laws across Europe
can only be explained if religious factors are taken into consideration. A pre-
dominant Catholic church and a larger proportion of Catholics within a
country lead to more restrictive laws. Minkenberg (2002) arrives at
similar conclusions concerning abortion regulations: A strong Catholic
FIGURE 1. Public and personal issue salience of morality issue. Note: The results
are based on the following survey question: (1) How salient is this ballot issue for
you personally? (2) How salient do you think is this issue for the general public?
These questions weren’t asked for the first two ballot votes. The numbers on the
x-axis identify the different ballot issues as depicted in Table 1.
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church leads to more restrictive abortion regulations, whereas Protestants
seem to be in general more liberal concerning abortion issues. The study
by Morgan and Meier (1980) concentrates on the religious effects on refer-
enda voting in Oklahoma and concludes that religious factors on the county-
level are just as important as economic factors in explaining moral policy
outcomes in referenda voting. This is in line with findings by Fairbanks
(1977) on state liquor and gambling laws in the United States: Religious
forces offer better explanations of the variance across states than economic
interests.
Drawing on these insights and with regard to direct democratic deci-
sion-making, religion should factor heavily into individuals’ vote deci-
sions (liberalizing or restrictive) on moral issues. On a general level an
affiliation or self-identification with a particular religious tradition
should impact on political behavior because it provides a social context
in which individuals can connect their faith to political choices (Green
2010, 24). First, an individual’s core values are rooted in a respective reli-
gious tradition and these core values are an important source for voting
decisions. Second, religious leaders or members of the clergy provide
internal cues by emphasizing the importance of these core values and
by taking positions on political issues (Djupe and Gilbert 2008).
However, these social processes are not limited to the local parish.
Individual positions may also be influenced by the prevailing religious
norms within the wider community (Kotler-Berkowitz 2001; Lenksi
1961; Traunmüller 2011). And third, political parties, interest groups,
and candidates seek support from religious communities by providing
them with actionable information. As a result, individual voting behavior
may be strongly influenced by general party alignments and the positions
political parties take on moral issues. Actual religious participation rein-
forces all of these three mechanisms, since the most active members
will be likely to most strongly adhere to the core values of their religious
community and will also be more likely to be exposed to internal cues or
external appeals (Djupe and Gilbert 2008; Green 2010; Norris and
Inglehart 2004; Verba et al. 1995).
Regarding the traditional confessional cleavage in Switzerland — and
therefore the belonging dimension of religion2 — we hypothesize that
Protestants and Catholics will differ in their voting behavior on moral
issues. An influential line of thought stresses the lasting role religious tra-
ditions play in forming the cultural and social life in a given nation or
region (Fox 2013; Inglehart and Baker 2000; Norris and Inglehart 2004;
Toft et al. 2013; Weber [1920] 1988). According to this perspective,
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distinctive worldviews that were historically linked with or that once ori-
ginated from religious traditions have left deep imprints on contemporary
moral beliefs and values. Today, these values are part of the general
culture and are shared by most of the citizens in a given context— regard-
less of whether they actually identify with the religious tradition. For
example, the Protestant ethic of hard work and an ascetic life became
imprinted in peoples’ minds following Calvin’s sermon in Geneva, and
still has a psychological impact on Protestants, even on those who do
not believe in predestination (Geissbühler 1999, 227). Accordingly, we
not only expect that citizens differ in their voting decisions on moral
issues depending on their individual religious belonging, i.e., whether
they are Protestant or Catholic (Hypothesis 1), but also depending on
the dominant religious tradition in the regional context within which
they are situated (Hypothesis 2).3
One fundamental difference between Protestant and Catholic world-
views with far reaching consequences for moral values concerns the
role of the individual in its relation to God and the wider community:
Whereas Protestants emphasize the individual’s relationship with God,
Catholics believe that the individual is related to God through the commu-
nity (Greeley 1989, 485). The opposing positions of the generally more
conservative Catholics who support traditional moral issues and the
more liberal and flexible attitudes of Protestants are thus deeply rooted
in the traditions’ respective communalism and individualism (Norris and
Inglehart 2004; Scheepers and van der Slik 1998; Scott 1998). This
also suggests that the moral positions of the two religious traditions will
depend on the specific content of the respective issue: “Protestants will
be especially likely to deplore vices which diminish personal integrity,
honesty, and sense of duty. Catholics will be especially likely to be
offended by actions which seem to violate relationship networks — adul-
tery, prostitution, suicide” (Greely 1989, 487). As a result, we expect that
Catholics will in general vote more restrictively on issues such as stem cell
research as well as on abortion or homosexuality, but will be more liberal
on issues concerning alcohol and drug use or gambling as compared to
Protestants who may be inclined toward a rather ascetic and pious lifestyle
(Greely 1989; Richard et al. 2000) (Hypothesis 3).
Although religious belonging has long been the primary mode connect-
ing religion and political behavior, scholars in both the United States and
Europe argue that differences within religious traditions are becoming
more politically relevant than differences among religious traditions
(Geissbühler 1999; Green 2010; Voll 1991; Wolf 1996). In other words,
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the old confessional gap of the Protestant/Catholic divide is increasingly
replaced by a new religious gap dividing the religious from the secular.
Religious behaving is more or less independent of an individual’s denom-
ination and reflects true religiosity as well as the actual incorporation of
religious beliefs and values (Nicolet and Tresch 2009). It is therefore
important to compare individuals who are highly religious to those who
are less or not religious. Moreover, the effect from religious belonging
on the voting decision may be affected by the actual religious behavior.
For instance, a negative effect from Catholic religious belonging should
be even stronger for individuals that regularly attend religious service.
Concerning the religious behaving dimension we thus hypothesize that,
first, religious behavers will vote more restrictively on moral issues
(Hypothesis 4). And second, that the effect of religious belonging on
the voting decision concerning moral issues will be stronger for indivi-
duals that regularly attend religious service (Hypothesis 5).
The juxtaposition of the old confessional and the new religious cleav-
age already suggests a changing role of individual religiosity on voting
behavior over time, but the exact nature of this dynamic is far from
clear. There are heated debates concerning the changing role of religion
in the public and political sphere. The popular view of secularization pre-
dicts that the effect of religious belonging as well as religious behaving
will decline over time as the moral authority of the churches weakens
and people become more individualized in their preferences and values.
Moreover, rapid social changes, urbanization, enhanced political mass par-
ticipation, and economic prosperity undermine the importance of religion
for individuals and modern states (Bruce 2002; 2009; Fox 2013; Norris
and Inglehart 2004). Despite this emphasis on the social irrelevance of
religion in secularized democracies, the opposite may be just as plausible.
In fact, proponents of post-materialism, such as Ronald Inglehart (1977),
argue that the shift from materialist politics to more value-based politics
actually increases the salience of religiosity for political orientations
as well as behaviors and thus renders religion more important.
Accordingly, Geser (1997, 3) asserts that “while these developments cer-
tainly help to bring attitudinal divergences between religious and non-reli-
gious population segments into sharper relief (e.g., in the abortion issue),
they may also favor the survival (or even the strengthening) of inter-con-
fessional divergences.” In this line, Toft et al. (2011) as well as Fox (2013)
argue that the religious divide still persists but has changed from the ani-
mosities between different religious groupings to greater conflicts between
religious and secular segments of the population. Summarizing these two
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arguments we cannot formulate a clear-cut hypothesis as the effect of reli-
gious belonging and behaving on decisions concerning moral issues could
both decrease or increase over time (Hypothesis 6).
As already mentioned party politics may further play a crucial role in
defining the relationship between individual religiosity and voting deci-
sions on moral issues, since parties seek to mobilize the support of their
constituencies, and further provide information as well as political
recommendations. In Switzerland, the Christ-Democratic Popular Party
(CVP) — which originated from the classical confessional cleavage in
Switzerland — may have a strong influence on how Catholics and reli-
gious individuals in general vote on moral issues. In this line, we
predict that a liberal party parole from the CVP should influence religious
belongers and behavers to cast a more liberal vote on moral issues
(Hypothesis 7).
DATA AND METHODS
To test our seven hypotheses we draw on the Vox Analysis, which com-
prise standardized surveys of 1,000 respondents conducted for each
issue of every national public vote in Switzerland since 1977. These
Vox surveys were established to receive better insights into individual
voting behavior in Swiss initiatives and referenda. Accordingly, they not
only ask vote-specific questions (e.g., participation, decision), but also
collect information on general socio-economic variables such as sex,
age, education, or religious affiliation. Overall we identified 15 moral
issue votes for the period between 1992 and 2012, but unfortunately,
since one of our main explanatory variables — church attendance — is
missing for two referenda, we had to limit our sample to 13 referenda
and initiatives. Among them are three concerning questions of genetic
engineering, seven concerning issues of drug abuse or gambling (addictive
behavior), and three on abortion and homosexuality (sexuality). Individual
decisions in these moral referenda are our dependent variable and are
coded 1 for a liberal decision and 0 for a restrictive decision on the
respective moral issue.4 Out of the 13 moral issues on the Swiss national
ballot between 1992 and 2012, 11 resulted in a liberal decision.
Our main explanatory variables are an individual’s religious affiliation
(belonging) and church attendance (behaving), both of which capture the
institutional dimension of religion as well as the old and new religious
cleavage in Switzerland (Nicolet and Tresch 2009). As we are mainly
The Religious Factor in Referenda Voting 429
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755048314000303
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 20:50:53, subject to the Cambridge Core
interested in the difference in voting behavior of Catholics and Protestants,
we restrict our sample to these two-denominational categories. Forty-three
percent of the respondents in our sample identify as Protestant and
42 percent as Catholic. All other confessions as well as the non-religious
are not considered in the following analysis. The religious denomination
dummy is coded 0 for Protestants and 1 for Catholics. Overall
Protestants and Catholics are equally distributed in each of the 13 surveys.
Religious behaving is measured as a respondents’ church attendance
which ranges from 1 (never) to 5 (once a week) and is treated as continu-
ous. Figure 2 depicts the percentages of weekly (upper graph) and no
church attendance (lower graph) for Catholics and Protestants in the 13
moral issue votes in Switzerland. From the upper graph we can conclude
that Catholics are more frequent church goers than Protestants, whereas
they hardly differ in the category for no church attendance (see lower
graph). In sum, there are some minor fluctuations throughout the 13
popular votes, but in general both percentages of weekly and no church
attendance are rather stable over the years.
We further consider the percentage of Catholics on the cantonal level as
well as the regional mean of church attendance to test the effects of con-
textual religiosity. Information for the former is taken from official Swiss
census data (Eidgenoessische Volkszaehlung 2000); information on can-
tonal religious behaving was aggregated from the individual level
survey data. Following our argumentation from Hypothesis 7 we further
include the vote recommendation from the Christ-Democratic Popular
Party (0 = restrictive, 1 = liberal) on the referendum level in order to
capture a potential political party influence.
Finally, we take into account additional control variables that are said to
influence individual political behavior in popular votes. These are age,
gender, educational level, and political ideology on the individual level.
The prediction is that older, less educated, and ideologically right indivi-
duals will generally hold more conservative attitudes leading to a less
liberal voting decision (see for example, Milic 2008). Concerning
gender we assume that females will generally be more restrictive in
their voting pattern, although they are said to be more liberal on issues
concerning homosexuality (Olson et al. 2006). As a Swiss specific vari-
able we add a measure for the linguistic region to the models and
further control for urbanization as this factor is often said to lead to
more liberal values (Inglehart and Baker 2000). All variables except for
the dummies are standardized by subtracting the mean and dividing by
two standard deviations (Gelman and Hill 2007).
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To test the hypotheses on religion’s role in individual voting behavior,
we estimate a series of Cross-classified Logistic Multilevel Models where
N = 5147 individual respondents are cross-classified according to two
grouping levels: J = 13 referenda and K = 26 cantons (Gelman and Hill
FIGURE 2. Minimum and maximum church attendance by denomination and
moral issue vote. Note: The numbers on the x-axis identify the different ballot
issues as depicted in Table 1.
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2007). The estimation procedure is based on Maximum Penalized
Likelihood, which is equivalent to Bayesian estimation with priori-distri-
bution of the unknown variance component (Chung et al. 2012). We
use the blme-package in R for the estimation (Dorie 2011).
RESULTS
Our results are presented in Tables 2 and 3. To test our hypotheses we
proceed as follows: First, we ran a model testing the traditional confession-
al cleavage between Protestants and Catholics together with the new divide
along religious behaving (M1). In the next step, we add the interaction
between both of these variables (M2). Model M3 further includes the vari-
ables for the religious contexts on the cantonal level, and models M4 and
M5 test the cross-level-interactions between individual and cantonal level
religiosity allowing a varying slope for individual religiosity. We then turn
to the referendum level where models M6 and M7 introduce the time per-
spective analyzing the potential secularization processes. We accommodate
this in the models by letting the slopes of individual religiosity vary over
referenda and including a cross-level interaction between individual religi-
osity and year on the referendum level. As we further predict that Catholics
and Protestants will differ in their voting behavior based on the specific
moral issue dimension, we then introduce a model testing the cross-level
interaction between individual religiosity and the referendum specific
moral issue dimensions (M8 and M9). Last, we test whether the vote rec-
ommendation by the CVP in a given referendum affects the way individual
religiosity is related to vote choice in M10 and M11.
Before turning to the results of primary interest we can quickly summar-
ize the effects of the control variables. Throughout the models as depicted
in Tables 2 and 3 we see that younger and higher educated respondents as
well as males and persons whose political views tend toward the left will
be more likely to vote liberally on moral issues. Living in a more urbanized
area adds to this positive effect, whereas language region is unimportant.
Turning to the effects of religion and looking at M1 in Table 2, we find
that religious belonging has a negative but not significant impact on a liberal
vote decision concerning moral issues. Thus substantively, and contrary to
our Hypothesis 1, Protestants and Catholics do not differ in their vote choice
regarding moral policy. In contrast to this, the effect of church attendance on
liberal vote decisions is highly significant and negative indicating that
regular church goers will be more likely to vote restrictively on moral
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Table 2. Regression results from multilevel analysis on the effect from religious
belonging and behaving on liberal vote decisions – individual and cantonal
influences
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5
Individual level
religious belonging −0.10 −0.11 −0.11 −0.09 −0.08
(1 = Catholic) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08)
religious behaving −0.70** −0.81** −0.66** −0.69** −0.71**
(0.07) (0.10) (0.10) (0.07) (0.10)
belonging*behaving 0.18
(0.13)
female −0.15** −0.16** −0.14** −0.15** −0.14**
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
age −0.30** −0.31** −0.30** −0.30** −0.28**
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
education 0.08** 0.08** 0.09** 0.09** 0.10**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
political ideology −0.17** −0.18** −0.16** −0.17** −0.16
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.15)
Cantonal level
% Catholics 0.12 0.34 0.07
(0.15) (0.20) (0.16)
mean attendance −0.20 −0.21 −0.16
(0.14) (0.20) (0.15)
belonging* % Catholics −0.36
(0.26)
belonging*mean 0.10
attendance (0.25)
behaving* % Catholics 0.17
(0.28)
behaving*mean 0.03
attendance (0.25)
urban region −0.16** −0.16** −0.16** −0.17** −0.15**
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
linguistic region 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.18
(0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Intercept 0.83 0.82 0.80 0.81 0.77
(0.29) (0.29) (0.31) (0.31) (0.32)
Variance components
intercept SD cantons 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.15
slope SD belonging 0.16
slope SD behaving 0.26
intercept SD referenda 0.86 0.86 0.89 1.00 0.74
N Individuals 5147 5147 5147 5147 5147
J Referenda 13 13 13 13 13
K Cantons 26 26 26 26 26
Note: Results from cross-classified logistic multilevel models; unstandardized coefficients (logits)
presented; standard errors in parentheses; *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01; correlations between varying
intercepts and varying slopes not shown.
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Table 3. Regression results from multilevel analysis on the effect from religious
belonging and behaving on liberal vote decisions – influences on referendum-level
M6 M7 M8 M9 M10 M11
Individual level
religious belonging 0.18 −0.07 0.04 −0.06 −0.35* −0.05
(1 = Catholic) (0.15) (0.07) (0.19) (0.07) (0.18) (0.07)
religious behaving −0.69** −0.42 −0.71** −0.42 −0.68** −1.33**
(0.07) (0.29) (0.07) (0.25) (0.07) (0.31)
female −0.14** −0.14** −0.16** −0.14** −0.17** −0.13
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
age −0.31** −0.30** −0.31** −0.28** −0.32** −0.28**
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
education 0.09** 0.09** 0.09** 0.09** 0.09** 0.08**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
political ideology −0.17** −0.16** −0.17** −0.15** −0.15** −0.14**
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Cantonal level
urban region −0.13** −0.14** −0.15** −0.14** −0.12 −0.12
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
linguistic region 0.15 0.17 0.15 0.19 0.17 0.17
(0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Referendum level
year −0.01 −0.03
(0.05) (0.06)
belonging*year −0.04**
(0.02)
behaving*year −0.05
(0.03)
issue dimensiona
addictive behavior −0.67 −0.27
(0.52) (0.66)
sexuality 0.27 0.70
(0.62) (0.79)
belonging*add.behav. −0.09
(0.23)
belonging*sexuality −0.35
(0.27)
behaving*add.behav. −0.17
(0.30)
behaving*sexuality −1.11**
(0.36)
CVP recommendation 1.37** 1.40**
(0.43) (0.51)
belonging *CVP recom. 0.33
(0.20)
behaving*CVP recom. 0.70**
(0.35)
Continued
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issues. This result is in line with our prediction from Hypothesis 4. Based on
these results one may further assume that only religious adherents, which
regularly attend religious services will differ in their voting behavior on
moral issues. Turning to the results of M2 which test this assumption as
stated in Hypothesis 5 we see, however, that this prediction is not confirmed
as the interaction term between religious belonging and behaving is far from
significant. The effect from religious belonging on a liberal vote decision,
thus, is not conditional on the level of an individual’s actual religious behav-
ing. The new religious cleavage between the religious and the secular is
clearly more relevant when it comes to referenda voting on moral issues
than the traditional confessional cleavage between Protestants and
Catholics. Whatever value differences may have existed between the two
confessions in the past, they are not visible any more today. This also
holds when we look at religion as explanatory factors on the cantonal
level. Here, neither the regional share of Catholics nor the average church
attendance rates in the cantons affect the probability of casting a liberal
vote on moral issues (M3). Religious contexts also do not moderate the
effects of individual religious belonging or behaving on voting behavior
concerning moral issues (M4 and M5).
Table 3 introduces explanatory factors on the referendum level. M6 and
M7 test the assumptions of the (non-)secularization theory (Hypothesis 6).
We estimated two separate models for the time dependency of the effects
of religious belonging and religious behaving, respectively, by adding
interactions with years to the equations. However, we only find a signi-
ficant interaction between religious belonging and year of the referendum.
Table 3. Continued
M6 M7 M8 M9 M10 M11
Intercept 0.83 1.05 1.12 0.76 −0.30 −0.41
(0.50) (0.55) (0.47) (0.58) (0.41) (0.48)
Variance components
Intercept SD cantons 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.19
Intercept SD 0.89 1.00 0.95 0.63 0.76
Referenda
slope SD belonging 0.15 0.81 0.19
slope SD behaving 0.51 0.36 0.47
N Individuals 5147 5147 5147 5147 5147 5147
J Referenda 13 13 13 13 13 13
K Cantons 26 26 26 26 26 26
Note: Results from cross-classified logistic multilevel models; unstandardized coefficients (logits)
presented; standard errors in parentheses; *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01; correlations between varying
intercepts and varying slopes not shown, areference category is genetic engineering.
The Religious Factor in Referenda Voting 435
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755048314000303
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 20:50:53, subject to the Cambridge Core
Relative to Protestants, Catholics tend to vote slightly more restrictively
over the years. Whereas the two denominations did not differ in
their voting behavior in 1993, Catholics voted more restrictive than
Protestants in referenda from 2003 onwards (see Figure 3 for an illustra-
tion). The effect of individual church attendance in turn is not moderated
by time but stays stable over the period of investigation. Both results run
counter to the idea of a decreasing public relevance of religion as put
forward by classical secularization theory. That the increase in restrictive
voting of Catholics cannot be reduced to specific issues decided at the
ballot becomes apparent when we look at whether Protestants and
FIGURE 3. Cross-level interactions between individual religiosity and referendum
characteristics. Note: Based on the results reported in Table 3; Conditional effects
(logits) and 95% confidence intervals shown.
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Catholics differ in their voting behavior depending on the content of the
moral issue in question (M8). This is not the case as the non-significant
findings for the interactions between issue dimensions and individual reli-
gious denomination suggest. While the graph in Figure 3 shows that
Catholics tend to vote more restrictively on issues on sexual morality
the confidence interval includes zero. Instead, and turning to the results
of M9 which includes the interaction between religious behaving and
the moral issue dimensions, we find that regular churchgoers will vote
markedly less liberal on policies concerned with questions of abortion
and homosexuality than on other moral policy issues. Indeed, differences
in the attitudes toward abortion and homosexuality seem to lie at the very
heart of the moral cleavage between religious and secular segments of the
Swiss population.
Finally, the results of M10 and M11 show that part of the connection
between individual religiosity and voting behavior depends on the mobil-
ization by political parties. Regardless of respondents’ denomination, the
nature of the CVP’s vote recommendation has a strong effect on their vote
decision: if the CVP recommends a liberal vote decision both Protestants
and Catholics are more likely to cast a liberal vote on the moral issue.
Moreover, as the significant interaction between vote recommendation
and religious behaving shows, a liberal vote recommendation from the
CVP considerably decreases the general restrictive vote intention of
regular churchgoers. This result, which is in line with our Hypothesis 7,
clearly demonstrates an important political mechanism of how individual
religiosity translates into political decisions at the ballot.
CONCLUSION
The aim of our study was to investigate the religious factor in referenda
voting on moral issues. We went beyond the existing research literature
on direct democracy and moral politics by shifting our focus away from
the policy outcomes of referenda and instead turning to the input side of
direct democracy: how does religion influence citizens’ vote decisions in
referenda and popular initiatives regarding moral issues? Although 11 out
of the 13 moral referenda in Switzerland since 1992 resulted in a liberal
decision, suggesting growing liberal tendencies overall, religion turns out
to be a crucial factor in explaining differences in individual voting behavior.
In particular, our results show that religious behaving, and not nominal
religious belonging, plays a crucial role in decision making on issues
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concerning abortion, genetic engineering, drug abuse gambling, and
homosexuality. Actual religious practice in terms of church attendance
leads to more restrictive votes. This effect has been very stable over the
years and gives evidence for the continuing role of religion in explaining
moral issue votes. However, Protestants and Catholics do not differ in their
voting patterns on moral issues, even when taking into account the reli-
gious behaving dimension. In addition, the voting patterns of Catholics
and Protestants do not differ across specific moral issues.
This result supports the general idea that traditional confessional clea-
vages between members of different denominations are increasingly
being replaced by a new religious cleavage that divides the religious
from the secular and thus adds to the current debate on the stability and
change of religious cleavage voting in Europe (e.g., Ackermann and
Traunmüller 2014; Brooks et al. 2006; Elff 2007; Essmer and Pettersson
2010; Knutsen 2004; Minkenberg 2010). As our findings on the moderat-
ing role of the CVP’s vote recommendation for the vote choices of regular
churchgoers show, this “new” religious cleavage is characterized by clear
party alignments and political loyalties that extend from electoral to direct
democratic voting behavior.
While we took a slightly different analytic perspective due to the unique
availability of referenda specific surveys in Switzerland, our study also
lends support and generalizes some of the previous findings drawn
from American research on moral politics, direct democracies, and the role
of religion (Campbell 2007; Donovan et al. 2008; Fairbanks 1977;
Feddersen et al. 2009; Fiorina 2005; Green 2010; Morgan and Meier 1980;
Olson et al. 2006; Roh and Haider-Markel 2003). Heated political debates
pitting religious and secular segments of the population against one another
on moral issues such as abortion or gay rights are by no means unique to
the United States. In fact, questions of abortion rights and the recognition
of homosexuality are also the core issues that divide the religious and non-reli-
gious in the Swiss case. Since the question of opening upmorality issues to the
ballot box arises in more and more democratic countries, future research
should undertake similar analyses in countries such as Italy, Ireland,
Portugal, or New Zealand to increase our understanding of how religion
and politics define how we should and should not live.
NOTES
1. In our study, we will stick to the most prominent moral issues stated in literature (especially Knill
2013; Mooney 2001; Studlar 2001) as they occur mostly in public referenda. Moreover, the Catholic as
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well as the (Swiss) Protestant church hold unambiguous restrictive opinions on these issues, which
makes them rather clear-cut on this dimension.
2. Individual religiosity is usually conceptualized as a multi-dimensional construct compromising
the three B’s of religiosity: belonging, behaving, and believing (e.g., Jelen 2009; McTague and
Layman 2009; Nicolet and Tresch 2009; Putnam and Campbell 2012; Stark and Glock 1968).
Throughout social science this construct is better known as religious commitment (Stark and Glock
1968), which has long been used to capture the effects from individual aspects of religion on social
and political behavior (Jelen 2009; McTague and Layman 2009). The three aspects of religiosity,
belonging, behaving, and believing, are thereby not country specific, although this concept has
been mainly used to analyze the effects of religious commitment in the American context (Jelen
2009; Layman 2001; McTague and Layman 2009; Olson et al. 2006; Stark and Glock 1968). This
multi-dimensional construct of religious membership applies to all countries where religion is
present, and thus should be appropriate to conceptualize Swiss religiosity as well. Whereas belonging
refers to a more or less formal affiliation or self-identification with a particular religious tradition,
behaving refers to the actual practice of one’s faith, most prominently church attendance. Believing
complements the concept of individual religiosity and refers to the particular religious contents and
ideas an individual holds. We only focus on religiosity in terms of belonging and behaving, since
these are the only aspects captured in our surveys. This distinction however applies very well to the
traditional confessional cleavage between Catholics and Protestants and the more recent religious
cleavage between the secular and the religious.
3. Of course, Protestants do not constitute a homogeneous group. There are numerous heteroge-
neous branches, especially in the United States context (Putnam and Campbell 2012). In Europe,
Protestants are divided historically in Reformed (Calvinists) and Lutherans (Manow 2002). In
Switzerland, however, the vast majority of Protestants are Reformed based on the strong historic con-
nection to Calvin and Zwingli (Geissbuehler 1999).
4. Some of the values for votes had to be rotated so that a “yes vote” equals a liberal decision and a
“no vote” equals a restrictive decision.
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APPENDIX
Table A1. Variable Description
Variable Operationalization and source
Individual level
Vote decision Respondent’s vote decision on the respective moral issue; 1 = liberal
vote, 0 = restrictive vote (Source: Vox-Data)
Religious belonging Respondent’s religious affiliation; 0 = Protestant, 1 = Catholic
(Source: Vox-Data)
Religious behaving Regularity of church attendance ranging from 1 = “once a week” to
5 = “never” (Source: Vox-Data)
Age Age measured in years (Source: Vox-Data)
Sex 0 =male, 1 = female (Source: Vox-Data)
Education Respondent’s highest educational degree; 1 = low, 2 = modest, 3 =
high (Source: Vox-Data)
Political ideology Self-placement on the left-right scale ranging from 0 = far left to 10
= far right (Source: Vox-Data)
Cantonal level
Percentage of
Catholics
Percentage of Catholics of all religious adherents in Switzerland
(Source: Federal Office of Statistics)
Mean church
attendance
Aggregated values for regularity of church attendance ranging from
1 = “once a week” to 5 = “never” (Source: Vox-Data)
Urban area 0 = rural area, 1 = urban area (Source: Vox-Data)
Linguistic region 1 = German, 2 = French, 3 = Italian (Source: Vox-Data)
Referendum level
Year Year vote took place (1993–2008) (Source: Vox-Data)
Issue dimension Issue of vote/referendum: 1 = genetic engineering, 2 = addictive
behavior, 3 = sexuality (Source: Vox-Data)
Christ-Democratic
Popular Party vote
recommendation
1 = liberal vote recommendation, 0 = restrictive vote
recommendation (Source: Vox-Data)
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